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I.  INTRODUCTION
Visits to the hospital, particularly for an emergency, are often fraught with anx-
iety and apprehension for both patients and accompanying family members.  It is not 
unimaginable to think however, that for a patient who feels terrible enough to go to 
the emergency room, it may be a relief to turn control over to medical professionals. 
The chance that a doctor might make a mistake might cross a patient’s mind; at that 
moment, however, the patient must trust that the doctor will not.  But people, and 
particularly systems, are fallible; it can be easy to misread a number on a script or 
pick up the wrong vial.  When mistakes happen, patients may be angry, or worse, 
injured.  Some patients will want to sue.  Whether or not a patient decides to sue, all 
healthcare consumers want the provider to identify and correct the error.  Society as 
a whole is invested in making sure that the mistake does not happen again to someone 
else.  
Healthcare providers are equally invested in correcting errors.  In part, this in-
vestment is a result of the complex federal and state regulatory structure that governs 
their activities.1  One example of this regulatory complexity can be found in the dif-
fering state laws that require reporting of errors made by healthcare providers.  These 
incident reports help providers analyze failures that have led, or may have led, to 
patient harm, and are part of an ongoing debate about error disclosure, patient rights, 
and quality of health care.2  In some states, incident reports are statutorily granted 
nearly complete confidentiality.3  Yet in other states, patients have been granted full 
access to incident reports, including those that were previously held to be confiden-
tial.4  Recent federal legislation grants some additional protection to these reports of 
error.  Incident reporting is an extremely important piece of the improvement of the 
quality of the healthcare system, but can only be effective if the information is con-
sistently privileged. 
This note argues that the confidentiality of incident reports must be guaranteed 
in order to satisfy the concurrent and different needs of providers, regulators, and 
patients.  This argument is not new.  As early as 1993, researchers proposed various 
model legislative schemes creating separate or additional privileges for incident re-
1. Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War over the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege on the Business of 
American Health Care, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 301, 304 (2006) (“Few areas of endeavor are 
steeped so deeply in labyrinthine regulations and convoluted statutory provisions as American health 
care . . . .”); see also Michelle M. Mello, Carly N. Kelly & Troyen A. Brennan, Fostering Rational 
Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 375 (2005).
2. The term incident report can refer to many types of reports, some of which will be discussed in Part II 
below.  For the purposes of this note, an incident report is a report that either describes or analyzes a 
medically related incident that occurred within the course of a patient’s care, such as a medication error 
or a wrong site surgery, and is used for purposes either internal to a hospital or for external reporting to 
a regulatory or accrediting agency.  This note generally will not consider intentional harm to patients or 
a facility’s accidents, such as a chair that breaks underneath a patient in a waiting room.  See, e.g., 
Berggren v. Saint Vincent’s Catholic Med. Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., No. 10129/04, 2004 WL 2903641, at *1 
(Sup. Ct. Richmond County Dec. 13, 2004). 
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2008); Megrelishvili v. Our Lady of 
Mercy Med. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (1st Dep’t 2002).  
4. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. X, § 25.
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ports beyond those that already existed.5  In 2005, Congress enacted the Patient 
Safety and Quality Improvement Act (“PSQIA”), a federal law designed to encourage 
reporting of patient safety work product6 by providing an incentive of confidentiality 
to those who report to specific patient safety organizations.7  This new protection 
still does not go far enough.  Incident reports will continue to be disclosed and errors 
will still plague our healthcare system.8 
Part II of this note provides a broad background of the confidentiality generally 
given to a hospital’s quality assurance process and the privileges that have tradition-
ally been applied to quality assurance material.  It then focuses more narrowly on 
incident reports and compares current confidentiality statutes in two states that rep-
resent different ends of the disclosure spectrum, Florida and New York.  Part III will 
5. See generally Cynthia Dollar, Note, Promoting Better Health Care: Policy Arguments for Concurrent Quality 
Assurance and Attorney-Client Hospital Incident Report Privileges, 3 Health Matrix 259 (1993) 
(proposing a model rule for use by states to create a hospital incident report privilege); Jason M. Healy, 
William M. Altman & Thomas C. Fox, Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care 
Information, 40 Brandeis L.J. 595 (2002) (proposing model legislation to provide incentives and 
method for the reporting of quality information to the federal government by a specific group of 
institutions).  
6. Patient safety work product is defined in the new law’s proposed regulations as “any data, reports, 
records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written or oral statements (or copies of 
any of this material)” which is ultimately contributed to a patient safety evaluation, or reporting, system. 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 8112, 8120 (proposed Feb. 12, 2008) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
7. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Public L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 299b-1 to c-6 (2000 & Supp. 2005)); Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8112, 8113.  The analysis of medical errors will be held confidential if 
disclosed to a certified patient safety organization, but such protection is separate from and does not 
cover information gathered for a provider’s own internal investigation purposes or for purposes related 
to required reporting to regulatory and accrediting agencies.  Id. at 8123.  
8. Steven E. Pegalis, A Proposal to Use Common Ground That Exists Between the Medical and Legal Professions 
to Promote a Culture of Safety, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1056, 1063 (2006) (citing Lucian L. Leape & 
Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human:  What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384, 
2384–90 (2005)) (noting that five years after the initial Institute of Medicine’s report on medical errors, 
progress in patient safety improvements was very slow); see also Brent C. James, Prologue: Five Years 
Later—Are We Any Safer?, in 1 Advances in Patient Safety: From Research to implementation 
1, 1 (2005) (“[A]s a country, progress has fallen far short of the IOM’s ambitious goal.  Some members 
of the original IOM committee have publicly decried the lack of substantial progress . . . .”) (citing D.M. 
Berwick, Op-Ed., Invisible Injuries, Wash. Post, July 29, 2003, at A17; J. Morrisey, Patient Safety 
Proves Elusive, Mod. Health, Nov. 2004, at 1, 6–7, 25, 30, 32); Health Grades, The Fourth 
Annual Health Grades Patient Safety in American Hospitals Study  (April 2007), http://
www.healthgrades.com/media/DMS/pdf/PatientSafetyinAmericanHospitalsStudy2007.pdf (“Despite 
the f lurry of research, publications and process improvement activity that has occurred since the IOM 
report, there is a growing consensus that not much progress has been made leading to a visible national 
impact.  Our findings support this consensus.”).  A Health Grades study of patient safety in U.S. 
hospitals using Medicare hospitalization records between the years 2003 and 2005 found that 1.16 
million patient safety incidents had occurred in that timeframe, and that 247,662 patient deaths could 
have been prevented.  Id. at 4.  It should be noted, however, that the reliability of the Health Grades 
study has been called into question for a number of reasons.  See Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting 
Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 
Health Matrix 329, 346–48 (2005).
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examine the risks of non-confidentiality and contrast these risks with the rationales 
for disclosure.  Finally, Part IV will argue that the use of incident reports should be 
limited to their intended purposes—that of research by a hospital into its processes 
for the purposes of improvement and satisfaction of regulatory requirements, and 
preparation for litigation—and not an additional tool for use by plaintiffs seeking 
redress.  Therefore, federal legislation must go farther to protect all incident reports, 
including those that must be submitted to state departments of health.
II.  THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF QUALITY ASSURANCE ANALYSIS
A. Confidentiality in the Quality Assurance Process
Quality assurance is the term used for a healthcare provider’s review of its sys-
tems to improve patient safety and care.9  The confidentiality of quality assurance 
review in the healthcare industry has a robust, if inconsistent, history.  Confidentiality 
is granted to quality assurance activities on the premise that without such a promise, 
providers are less likely to participate or be truthful when participating in the quality 
assurance process.10  Without truthful and open participation, there can be no gen-
uine improvement. 
Many industries, including healthcare, recognize that employees are more willing 
to report errors if they know that their reports will remain confidential.11  It is rec-
ognized that the “mere fear of litigation due to disclosure of data is the greatest 
barrier to reporting.”12  In addition to an apprehension of litigation, disclosure spurs 
a fear of both reputational damage and professional sanctions.13  To further the 
quality assurance process, which entails making sure less focus is placed on those 
responsible and more is directed toward solutions, the trust of the potential reporters 
must be earned.  Dependable confidentiality goes far in earning such trust.  
Since regulating health care has typically been the province of the states,14 state 
law governs the confidentiality of medical peer review and quality assurance com-
mittees, as well as the reports and activities of those committees.15  State legislatures 
9. Dollar, supra note 5, at 264–66.
10. Id. at 279–80.
11. See, e.g., Dayna C. Nicholson & Lynsey A. Mitchel, A Medical Error Happened: Now What? The 
Implications for Medical Errors Heat Up, 10 J. Health Care Compliance 5 (2008) (describing the oft-
cited model of aviation safety and improvements).
12. Harrington, supra note 8, at 353 (citing Mimi Marchev, Nat’l Acad. for St. Health Pol’y, Med. 
Malpractice and Med. Error Disclosure: Balancing Facts and Fears 2 (2003), http://www.
nashp.org/Files/Medical_Malpractice_and_Medical_Error_Disclosure.pdf). 
13. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.
14. Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, Doing What Counts for Patient Safety: 
Federal Actions to Reduce Medical Errors and Their Impact 10 (2000), http://www.quic.gov/
Report/errors6.pdf; see also Duggin, supra note 1, at 329.  
15. See generally Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n, Public Interest Colloquium, Minimizing Medical 
Errors: Legal Issues in the Debate on Improving Patient Safety (2003); Duggin, supra note 1, 
at 329–30. 
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that enact laws granting confidentiality to the quality assurance process within hos-
pitals seem to have accepted the concept that people may be more likely to disclose 
errors if they are assured of confidentiality.16  Many states also provide confidenti-
ality to the discussions and reports of committees internal to healthcare providers 
whose job it is to review these quality assurance processes.17  Most often healthcare 
providers, in many cases hospitals, have a medical peer review committee to look 
after the medical staff as well as a type of quality assurance committee to monitor 
quality of care.18
Medical peer review is the process through which hospitals credential (grant 
privileges to) and evaluate the physicians who work for them.19  To be credentialed to 
practice and treat patients at a hospital, a physician must provide the hospital with, 
among other things, proof of his or her qualifications and competence, both initially 
and then on a regular basis over the course of his or her tenure.20  Should the physi-
cian’s qualifications or competence be called into question, the peer review committee 
will review the physician’s behavior and recommend measures to discipline or assist 
the physician.21  For example, if a physician shows up to work intoxicated, the peer 
review committee has the authority to investigate the physician’s reported behavior.22 
The peer review committee has the power to suspend that physician or even revoke 
his or her hospital privileges.23  Healthcare providers may also have quality assurance 
committees, which are responsible for risk management processes, such as investi-
16. See, e.g., Logue v. Velez, 92 N.Y.2d 13, 16–18 (1998).  
17. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3).  
18. See, e.g., Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101–11152 (2000).
19. See Steven Suydam, et al., Patient Safety Data Sharing and Protection from Legal Discovery, 3 Advances 
in Patient Safety: From Research to Implementation 361, 365 (2005).
20. See Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From Tort Doctrine 
Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1179, 1190 
(2006) (citing Credentialing & Peer Review Practice Group of The Am. Health Lawyer’s 
Ass’n, Peer Review Guidebook (3d ed. 2003)).  Physicians who seek to be credentialed at a hospital 
may have to provide additional information, such as disclosure of any conflicts of interest or evidence of 
good physical health.  Requirements vary from institution to institution.  For a good overview of these 
requirements as well as problems that physicians encounter with peer review committees, which in part 
led to the passage of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, see Pauline Martin Rosen, 
Medical Staff Peer Review: Qualifying the Qualified Privilege Provision, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 357 
(1993).
21. Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 1190. 
22. See id. at 1190–91. 
23. Id.  If a physician’s privileges are revoked, the physician cannot see patients at that hospital until the 
privileges are reinstated.  The physician is not precluded from seeking patients at another practice where 
he or she has privileges and that is independent of the hospital.  However, for behavior that compels a 
revocation of privileges, there may be a concurrent state board of medicine investigation that may 
ultimately determine whether the physician may keep his or her license to practice medicine.  Id.  For 
examples of types of reporting and investigations beyond those initiated by hospital peer review 
committees, see the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11137.
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gating accidents and other events that occur within the hospital.24  These committees 
are found in particular at skilled nursing facilities and other places that treat Medicare 
and Medicaid patients.25  These committees as a whole, not just at skilled nursing 
facilities, are responsible for recommending changes to processes that have not been 
working or that present a risk to patients.26
The purpose of providing protection for these processes is to ensure that the re-
viewers can perform their functions objectively and effectively.27  The state has an 
interest in improving medical care—whether by monitoring and disciplining physi-
cians, reporting incidents, or improving hospital systems.28  States therefore provide 
for the protection of peer review and quality assurance committee records by statute, 
although each state is different and protection in one state is by no means the same 
as protection in another.29  For example, in one state the final outcome of a peer re-
view hearing may be the only aspect of the review process that is kept confidential, 
while in another state the entire process is protected from disclosure.30  In addition, 
24. Dollar, supra note 5, at 279–84.
25. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 613.  Quality assurance committees at skilled nursing facilities already play 
a more significant role as the federal government has entered into Corporate Integrity Agreements with 
several of these facilities to address quality issues within the institutions—such agreements are normally 
associated with the federal government’s attempt to improve an institution’s billing issues.  Id. at 
611–61. 
26. For a government-mandated implementation of a quality assurance committee, see U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Serv., Corp. Integrity Agreement  Between Office of Inspector Gen. 
of the Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. and Green Valley Pavilion et al. 3 (May 2007), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/green_valley_pavilion_05012007.pdf (mandating 
creation of a Quality Assurance Compliance Committee “to address issues concerning quality of care at 
Green Acres’ nursing homes” and a Quality Assurance Monitoring Committee to, among other things 
“review the adequacy of Green Acres’ system of internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, and 
patient care”). 
27. See, e.g., Logue, 92 N.Y.2d at 16–18.  In Logue, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the legislative 
history behind two New York statutes that provide confidentiality to peer review and quality assurance 
proceedings, finding that “[t]he purpose of the discovery exclusion is to ‘enhance objectivity of the 
review process’ and to assure that medical review committees ‘may frankly and objectively analyze the 
quality of heath services rendered’ by hospitals.”  Id. at 17 (quoting Mem. of Assembly Rules Comm., 
Bill Jacket, L. 1971, ch. 990, at 6).  
28. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 329–30.
29. Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the Holes in the 
Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 346, 352 (2001) (“[S]tate-based peer review 
statutes are quite variable in their coverage.  Some state statutes cover some information; others, little; 
still others, only information generated by particular providers, such as hospitals, while ignoring other 
provider forms, such as managed care organizations.”); see also David H. Johnson & David W. Shapiro, 
The Institute of Medicine Report on Reducing Medical Error and Its Implications for Healthcare Providers and 
Attorneys, 12 Health Law. 1, 7–8 (2000) (“Unfortunately for confidentiality, these [peer review 
privilege] statutes vary considerably in their reach and strength.  Overall, this makes them a problematic 
source of legal protection for error data . . . .  The treatment of incident reports within an institution, for 
example, varies by state.”).  See generally Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care: 
Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote Patient Safety, 3 Hous. J. Health 
L. & Pol’y 219 (2003).
30. Dollar, supra note 5, at 283–84.
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as with the example of attorney-client privilege discussed below, disclosure of the 
information with a third party during the peer review or quality assurance process 
may constitute waiver of confidentiality.  This can hamper the sharing of quality of 
care information between healthcare institutions that seek to learn from each other’s 
mistakes.31  
Statute is not the only means by which quality of care information may be pro-
tected.  If quality of care information is sought by an adversary during discovery, 
providers may also rely on evidentiary privileges to protect the information.  The 
attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges may be invoked when the hos-
pital’s attorneys have participated in the internal investigation of an incident and in 
drafting an incident report.32  These privileges may be asserted concurrently with the 
assertion of statutory peer review or quality assurance privilege and confidentiality.
Attorney-client privilege protects conversations between attorney and client. 
The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests 
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”33  When such communica-
tion is guaranteed to remain confidential, a client may feel free to be completely 
honest with his or her attorney, which allows the attorney to provide the best pos-
sible advice.  When the client is a hospital, attorney-client privilege becomes a more 
complicated issue, because the hospital is a corporation and acts through its agents.34 
The question then becomes: to whom does this privilege apply?35  To determine 
whose communications with an attorney are covered by the corporate attorney-client 
privilege, courts have developed various tests, such as the control group test and the 
subject matter test.36  In the control group test, the agents of the corporations who 
were covered under the corporate attorney-client privilege were management-level 
employees or officers representing the corporation who sought legal advice from 
counsel on behalf of the corporation.37  The Supreme Court rejected the control 
group test in Upjohn Co. v. United States, recognizing that the privilege existed not 
just for an attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation but for an attorney to 
31. Suydam, supra note 19, at 362 (“One potential problem with such [regional safety consortia comprised 
of member healthcare institutions] . . . was that free exchange of information between institutions may 
render such information vulnerable to discovery by plaintiffs . . . by implied waiver of any peer review 
privilege that might exist . . . .”).
32. See generally Dollar, supra note 5.  
33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
34. For an extensive examination and discussion of the corporate attorney-client privilege, see Vincent C. 
Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191 
(1989).
35. See generally Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special 
Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1169 
(1997).
36. Id.
37. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391–93.
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receive information about the problem facing the corporation.38  The Supreme Court 
declined to establish an alternative test at that time.39  Another test, the subject 
matter test proposed in Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, protects conversations 
between an attorney and those employees, whether management or not, who had 
something to do with the subject matter of the incident which led to the attorney’s 
involvement.40  Whether in an individual context or in the corporate context, 
attorney-client privilege can easily be waived by disclosure—purposeful or inadver-
tent—to a third party.
Attorney work-product privilege protects an attorney’s notes and other materials 
created in anticipation of litigation, including an attorney’s thoughts and strategies.41 
One author of a law review article described attorney work product as follows: 
“[N]otes and other documents prepared by or for the organization’s attorneys as a 
result of an internal investigation are protected, but only if the work is done in antici-
pation of litigation.”42  As recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these 
materials are unavailable to an adverse party in litigation, except in cases of undue 
hardship.43  Th us, it appears that attorney work-product privilege is not as broad as 
attorney-client privilege because of the condition that it only covers material created 
in anticipation of litigation.44
Problems can arise for hospitals when they attempt to use these evidentiary priv-
ileges to shield incident reports from disclosure during litigation.  Examples of some 
problems include: cases in which the hospital has provided an incident report to a 
third party, such as an insurer or regulator;45 cases in which in-house hospital counsel 
“wears more than one hat” in the organization and the court finds that in preparing 
the incident report, counsel was acting in the capacity of business management, not 
counsel;46 and cases in which a hospital’s policy is to create a report for each incident, 
38. Id. at 390. 
39. Id. at 396–97.
40. 862 P.2d 870, 875 (Ariz. 1993) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 
1970), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)).
41. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
42. Gabriel Imperato, Internal Investigations, Government Investigations, Whistleblower Concerns: Techniques 
to Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 Ala. L. Rev.  205, 215–16 (1999).
43. In re Qwest Commc’n Int’l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(3)).
44. See generally Imperato, supra note 42, at 212–19.
45. See Liang, supra note 29, at 353 (“[E]rror and safety information must often be disclosed to third parties. 
For example, information about errors resulting in an adverse event must be reported to a particular 
state agency in roughly two dozen or so states and to JCAHO under its Sentinel Event Policy.”); Dollar, 
supra note 5, at 259 (“The attorney-client privilege does not consistently protect incident reports because 
they are prepared for other persons, such as liability insurers and hospital risk managers and quality 
committees, as well as for the attorney.”).
46. Greg Radinsky, The Compliance Officer Conundrum: Assessing Privilege Issues in a Health Care Setting, 5 
DePaul J. Health Care L. 1, 2–3 (2002).  It should be noted that currently this conflict arises more 
within the context of counsel who are also compliance officers at healthcare institutions.  Compliance 
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and the court finds a report to have been created in the ordinary course of business 
rather than in anticipation of litigation.47  One researcher has expressed the concern 
that, if others in management either direct the creation of or receive such reports, a 
court may find that the privileges do not apply because the reports were not created 
at the behest of counsel.48  In addition, the collaborative sharing of error reports 
among hospitals for the purpose of enhancing each other’s knowledge and processes 
may also waive the privilege because they are third parties.49  Overall, “[i]n the con-
text of internal investigations, counsel often cannot rely with total confidence on the 
most frequently invoked protections—the attorney-client privilege and the 
work-product doctrine.”50  This inability to rely on well-established confidentiality 
protections creates a serious impediment to accurate and thorough reporting, because 
hospitals and physicians will be reluctant to fully disclose if they believe their reports 
will end up in the hands of an adverse party.
The self-evaluative privilege is another privilege meant to protect a hospital’s 
quality assurance review procedures.51  The self-evaluative privilege is similar to 
statutory quality assurance privileges in that it is meant to shield internal review 
analysis.52  To qualify for the privilege, the information must have come from critical 
self-analysis, there must be public interest in having the practitioners engage in the 
self-analysis, and that self-analysis would stop if the information were discovered.53 
officers at healthcare institutions generally are responsible for ensuring that hospital bills, as well as 
Medicare and Medicaid claims, are accurate and correct, and that there has been no fraud.  However, 
compliance programs for quality assurance have begun to make their way into the healthcare industry, 
beginning with skilled nursing facilities as the federal government implements new quality assurance 
compliance programs in these institutions with particularly vulnerable populations.  Healy et al., supra 
note 5, at 611–12.  Therefore, this potential problem may become a more widespread issue if quality 
assuarance compliance programs move into other federally funded healthcare institutions, such as 
hospitals.  To this end, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has “begun to utilize quality 
factors as a basis for reimbursement decisions; the wave of the future is non-payment for medical care 
related to an adverse event.”  Nicholson & Mitchel, supra note 11, at 5.
47. Dollar, supra note 5, at 279 (“When the reports serve more than one purpose, even if both purposes 
serve important policies, the privilege is uncertain.”).
48. Id. at 274 (“Some courts have ruled that incident reports are not confidential communications because 
they are made under the direction of the hospital’s internal administration, not just the attorney, and the 
reports are delivered to hospital administrators and insurers.”).
49. See generally Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a 
Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 Seattle U. L. Rev. 155, 163–65 (2006) (describing how 
attorney-client privilege is more easily waived than the work-product privilege, though both may be 
waived by disclosure to a third party).
50. Thomas F. O’Neil & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primer for Health 
Care Lawyers, 5 Annals Health L. 33, 34 (1996).
51. See Dollar, supra note 5.
52. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 628–29 (referencing Bredice v. Doctor’s Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 
1970), aff ’d, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which the court found that the public interest in allowing 
hospitals to investigate a patient’s death outweighed disclosure).
53. Imperato, supra note 42, at 216–17 (quoting Thomas F. O’Neil & Adam H. Charnes, The Embryonic 
Self-Evaluative Privilege: A Primer for Health Care Lawyers, 5 Annals Health L. 33, 37 (1996)).
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When reporting is not required and the review process is voluntary, researchers cau-
tion that even then “those portions of a written report that compile, organize, and 
present all pertinent underlying facts nonetheless may well be disgorged, providing 
opposing parties with an easy road map for proving their claims, as well as admis-
sions of a party opponent that are extremely useful during litigation.”54  Despite its 
potential utility and similarity to statutory quality assurance privileges, courts have 
not universally accepted this privilege.55  
Finally, there is selective waiver—the disclosure of conf idential, 
privilege-protected information to a third party, such as a government regulator, 
with the understanding that the disclosure should not be construed as full waiver.56 
Sometimes the selective waiver doctrine is invoked if voluntary disclosure has been 
made under a confidentiality agreement with an investigating government agency.57 
In situations where the government is investigating fraud or billing claims, a hospital 
may attempt to demonstrate its cooperativeness with the government by waiving its 
privileges and disclosing confidential information in the hopes of receiving a reduc-
tion in penalties, but is not willing to share the confidential information with other 
interested persons not party to the agreement.58  The difficulty with selective waiver 
is that it is contractual and cannot bind third parties, so courts have found waiver, no 
matter under what agreement, to be complete.59  Healthcare providers considering 
whether to self-disclose to the government should not count on the doctrine of selec-
tive waiver to keep their incident reports confidential.60  Healthcare providers, 
therefore, may have statutory protection for quality of care information as well as 
potential coverage by evidentiary privileges.
54. O’Neil & Charnes, supra note 50, at 39.
55. See Healy et al., supra note 5, at 628–31.
56. Marks, supra note 49, at 165. 
57. See, e.g., In re HCA/Columbia Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
58. Duggin, supra note 1, at 313 (“The selective waiver conf lict pits individuals and entities who have 
voluntarily disclosed otherwise privileged materials to law enforcement authorities against third-party 
litigants seeking access to these materials in related civil litigation . . . .”).
59. Id. at 315–16.
60. See In re Qwest Commc’n Int’ l, Inc., 450 F.3d at 1186–94 (providing an overview of the state of the law 
surrounding selective waiver in various circuits, and in the process, clarifying Tenth Circuit law in this 
area by rejecting the selective waiver in all contexts).  Selective waiver in the context of attorney-client 
privilege has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit, but has been rejected by the D.C. Circuit, as well as 
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.  Id. at 1186–88.  In the context of attorney work 
product, the Fourth Circuit has adopted selective waiver in regards to opinion work product but rejected 
it with regard to non-opinion work product, and the First, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have 
rejected selected waiver for non-opinion work product.  Id. at 1190–91.  Further, the state of the law is 
unclear in the D.C. Circuit which has upheld, without providing analysis, a district court finding that 
the work-product doctrine had not been waived, but has in other circumstances rejected selective waiver 
of work-product protection. Id.
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New federal legislation will also provide additional protections to certain quality 
assurance material.61  The PSQIA “creates a new and strong federal privilege for 
patient safety work product, preempting state laws governing civil or administrative 
procedures that would require the disclosure of information by a healthcare provider 
to a certified PSO [Patient Safety Organization].”62  The legislation provides an in-
centive to providers to voluntarily report errors and other incidents by protecting all 
disclosures made to PSOs that are certified with, and governed by, the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality.63  The act also sets out that patient safety material 
disclosed to a PSO, or in specific other permitted circumstances, continues to be 
protected and there is no waiver because of this disclosure to a third party.64  Quality 
of care information that is not reported to a PSO is not protected.  The preamble to 
the proposed regulations, published in February 2008, stresses that “[p]roviders or 
PSOs that have a documented patient safety evaluation system will have substantial 
proof to support claims of privilege and confidentiality when resisting requests for 
production of, or subpoenas for, information constituting patient safety work 
product . . . .”65
The legislation seems promising, but the PSQIA will not solve all of a provider’s 
reporting disclosure problems while widely differing state policy concurrently exists,66 
and it does not protect disclosures made to state regulatory agencies.67  This means 
that if a copy of an incident report made for the purpose of reporting to a state 
61. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 § 299b-22.  The Act reads in pertinent part:
  42 USC 299b-22: Privilege and Confidentiality Protections.
  (a) Privilege.—Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, and 
subject to subsection (c), patient safety work product shall be privileged and shall not 
be—(1) subject to a Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative subpoena or 
order, including in a Federal, State, or local civil or administrative disciplinary proceeding 
against a provider; (2) subject to discovery in connection with a Federal, State, or local 
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding, including in a Federal, State, or local civil or 
administrative disciplinary proceeding against a provider; (3) subject to disclosure pursuant 
to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Freedom of 
Information Act) or any other similar Federal, State, or local law; (4) admitted as evidence 
in any Federal, State, or local governmental civil proceeding, criminal proceeding, 
administrative rulemaking proceeding, or administrative adjudicatory  proceeding, 
including any such proceeding against a provider . . . .
 Id. 
62. Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward a Federal Model of Medical Error Reduction, 12 
Widener L. Rev. 1, 17 (2005).
63. See id. 
64. See Charles M. Key, A Review of the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 18 Health 
Law. 20, 21 (2005).
65. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8120.
66. See, e.g., Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the Patient’s Right 
to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 25 Trial Advoc. Q. 7, 11 (2006) (noting the unknown impact that 
PSQIA’s regulations will have on relevant Florida law).  
67. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8123.  In addition, the regulations make clear 
that regulatory and accrediting agencies may not be certified as PSOs.  Id. at 8120, 8126–32.
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agency is submitted to a PSO, only the copy submitted to the PSO is protected by 
the federal privilege and confidentiality provisions.68  The proposed regulations set 
out that any entity that provides regulatory overview, such as accreditation or licen-
sure, may not be certified as a PSO because of the need to reassure providers that 
patient safety reporting to PSOs will not be punitive.69 
Healthcare providers must actually report in order to be protected: “the mere as-
sembling for the purpose of reporting medical errors or other quality information 
programs is not enough to trigger protection.”70  Those records compiled for internal 
risk management efforts and to report to external regulators will not be considered 
patient safety work product, so reports composed for purposes internal to the hos-
pital, as well as mandatory reports made to state agencies, may still be accessible.71 
In addition, encouraging providers to report will require convincing them that the 
report material will always be protected, which is no easy task when experiences in 
certain states, or certain courts, have shown them otherwise.72  For example, Florida’s 
recent constitutional amendment opens up all incident reports to the public, not just 
those created after the date of the amendment.73 
B.  Mandatory Incident Reporting in Florida and New York
An incident report is, in broad terms, the product of an internal investigation by 
a hospital into an event outside of the hospital’s normal occurrences.74  Incident re-
porting is defined by the National Patient Safety Foundation as “a process used to 
document occurrences that are not consistent with routine hospital operation or 
care.”75  The reporting and the investigation may be mandated by a state or federal 
regulatory agency.76  
68. Id. at 8123.
69. Id. at 8126–27.
70. Ice Miller LLP, Survey of Recent Developments in Health Law, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 1051, 1077 (2006). 
71. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121.
72. See Key, supra note 64, at 22 (“Only time, and the inevitable challenges, will tell whether the privilege is 
as sound as it seems . . . .”).  
73. See, e.g., North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kroll, 940 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  But see 
Michota v. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 04-1057-CI-19, 2005 WL 900771 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) 
(holding that Amendment 7 is not retroactive).
74. Dollar, supra note 5, at 263 (citing John F. Monagle, Risk Management: A Guide For Health 
Care Professionals 29 (1985)).
75. National Patient Safety Foundation, Patient Safety Definitions, (citing National Patient 
Safety Foundation, Lessons in Patient Safety (L.A. Zipperer & S. Cushman eds., 2001)), http://
npsf.org/rc/mp/definitions.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
76. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 329–32.
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An incident report serves two purposes.77  One purpose is to “prepare for poten-
tial litigation.”78  The second purpose is to analyze the incident and its circumstances 
with the goal of changing or implementing a process to avoid the occurrence of a 
similar event in the future.79  After an incident occurs, such as when a patient is 
given the wrong medication, a statute usually determines whether it must be re-
ported.80  The investigation into and reporting of the incident generally will be led 
by a member of the entity’s risk management or compliance team.81  
Examples of incidents that may need to be reported include instances of medical 
equipment failure, fire, medication mix-up, surgery on the wrong part of a patient’s 
body or surgery on the wrong patient.82  An incident that almost occurs but is averted 
is labeled a near miss.83  Near misses are less frequently required to be reported, al-
though some researchers argue that they are just, if not more, important in helping 
providers understand a system’s weaknesses.84
Within the healthcare industry, such occurrences are known by different names, 
such as incidents, adverse events, or sentinel events.  Often, the choice of label used 
depends upon the regulatory context, and there are many regulators within the 
healthcare industry with individual definitions of incident, resulting in no universal 
agreement about what, exactly, an incident entails.  For example, the National Patient 
Safety Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to improving the safety of 
patients, lists definitions currently used by institutions—adverse event is defined nine 
ways, accident two ways, and error seven ways.85  The Joint Commission for the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, also known as the Joint Commission or 
JCAHO, an independent organization that accredits healthcare organizations, refers 
to serious incidents as sentinel events within the context of its reporting 
77. Dollar, supra note 5, at 259.
78. Id.
79. See id. 
80. See generally Furrow, supra note 62, at 12; Lucian L. Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 New Eng. 
J. Med. 1633 (2002).
81. This will vary depending upon the organizational structure of the institution.
82. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-l (McKinney 2007).
83. Near misses are often reported along with actual incidents in voluntary reporting systems.  Committee 
on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building 
a Safer Health System 87 (Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter To Err Is Human] 
(“When voluntary systems focus on the analysis of ‘near misses’, their aim is to identify and remedy 
vulnerabilities in systems before the occurrence of harm.”); see also Ellen Flink et al., Lessons Learned 
from the Evolution of Mandatory Adverse Event Reporting Systems, in 3 Advances in Patient Safety: 
From Research to Implementation 135, 147 (2005) (“Near misses are a vital part of voluntary 
reporting systems.”). 
84. Liang, supra note 29, at 357–58.
85. National Patient Safety Foundation, Patient Safety Definitions, http://www.npsf.org/rc/mp/definitions.
php (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
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policy.86  One researcher sums up the vast variety of definitions—and the subtle im-
plications in choice of terms—as follows:
Much lies between the two extremes of blame-free accident and deliberate 
harm, and this is ref lected by the myriad terms competing to describe the 
phenomenon of error in medicine: accidents, mishaps, mistakes, errors, negli-
gence, failures, incompetence, misconduct, malpractice, def icient or 
substandard care, adverse or untoward events and the concept of iatrogenic 
harm all appear in the literature.  In addition, particularly serious incidents 
may warrant the label disaster.87
While this wealth of terminology could be viewed as simply a little extra work 
for a provider’s quality assurance committee, it is more complicated than that.  How 
an incident is defined can determine  what needs to be reported to regulatory au-
thorities and what is—or should be—protected from discovery in a medical 
malpractice claim.88  The proposed PSQIA regulations acknowledge this problem, 
which becomes particularly keen when providers from different states—and hence 
different regulatory regimes—report to a single PSO.  In the draft regulations, there-
fore, the Department of Health and Human Services actively seeks input in compiling 
a standard list of incidents that should be reported.89
In an environment with many regulators, there may be many different entities to 
which a hospital must report the occurrence of an incident, as “[s]tate and federal 
legislatures, state and federal administrative agencies, industry accrediting, profes-
sional and peer review organizations, courts and litigants, and purchaser organizations 
are all active regulators of patient safety today.”90  In at least twenty states, including 
Florida and New York, state law requires that incidents be reported to the state gov-
ernment.91  Like the variations found in the definitions of the word incident, these 
reporting systems are not all the same and do not require that the same events be 
86. Joint Comm’n, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, July 2007, available at http://www.
jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/F84F9DC6-A5DA-490F-A91F-A9FCE26347C4/0/SE_chapter_
july07.pdf.  JCAHO defines a sentinel event as “an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious 
physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.  Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or 
function.  The phrase ‘or the risk thereof ’ includes any process variation for which a recurrence would 
carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome.” Id.  JCAHO does not consider all medical 
errors to rise to the level of a sentinel event.  Id.
87. Oliver Quick, Outing Medical Errors: Questions of Trust and Responsibility, 14 Med. L. Rev. 22, 24 
(2006).
88. The difficulty with defining error, and the different definitions according to the regulatory context, can 
lead to problems in disclosure because what may be considered a reportable incident by one state or 
accreditation organization may not be considered as such by another.  For a discussion of the problems 
of defining and researching medical error, see Harrington, supra note 8.  
89. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8128–29.
90. Mello et al., supra note 1, at 403.
91. See American Health Lawyers Association, Public Interest Colloquium, Minimizing 
Medical Errors: Legal Issues in the Debate on Improving Patient Safety 14 (2003); Leape, 
supra note 80.  
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reported.92  In addition, some researchers point out that “[t]here is also a lack of uni-
formity among regulators regarding the degree of protection reports should receive 
from legal discovery and public scrutiny, creating uncertainty that especially affects 
multistate hospital chains.”93  Therefore, a provider that maintains hospitals in even 
two states has a much larger workload with potentially greater levels of uncertainty.
Such differences in confidentiality levels are apparent when comparing incident 
data across the nation, and such differences risk hindering the progress in improve-
ment of patient care.  This disparity in state practice is evidenced by comparing 
Florida and New York, two states in which incident reporting by hospitals is re-
quired.
 1. Florida
In Florida, hospitals must report incidents that result in patient injury to the 
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.94  Florida law requires hospitals to 
report categories of patient injuries in two types of reports.95  One, the Annual 
Report, requires a hospital to list all patient injuries that occurred over the course of 
a year, the employees or contractors involved in the injuries, and all malpractice 
claims against it.96  A second report, the Code Fifteen Report, gives an account to 
the Agency for Health Care Administration of injuries that result in patient “death, 
brain or spinal damage, surgery unrelated to the patient’s diagnosis, surgery to repair 
damage from a planned surgery, surgery to remove foreign objects, wrong site sur-
gery, wrong patient surgery, and wrong surgical procedure.”97  Formerly, there was a 
third report, the  Twenty-four Hour Report, which reported the above listed injuries 
to the agency within one day of the occurrence and serves as a preliminary notifica-
tion to the state that an incident has occurred.98  Until 2004, these incident reports 
were protected from disclosure as identified attorney work product99 and also ex-
empted from public disclosure by statute.100
92. Although beyond the scope of this note, this patchwork of requirements, aside from creating confusion 
and complexity, can lead to additional costs for healthcare systems that maintain hospitals in more than 
one state.  See Mello et al., supra note 1, at 409.
93. Id. at 409 (citation omitted).
94. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.0197 (West 2006).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Agency for Health Care Admin., Div. of Managed Care and Health Quality, Mandatory 
Serious Patient Injury Reporting: Summary Report Hospitals and Ambulatory Surgical 
Centers (1999), available at http://www.fdhc.state.f l.us/mchq/health_facility_regulation/Risk/
documents/1999_A_C_1999%20Annual%20Report%20Summary.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Bay Medical Ctr. v. Sapp, 535 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
100. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.0198 (West 2003) (repealed 2003).
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In 2004, Florida citizens voted to adopt a constitutional amendment that re-
quires Florida hospitals to provide patients, upon their request, with access to any 
incident reports created by the hospitals in response to adverse incidents.101  The 
amendment does not limit disclosure to incident reports related to the requesting 
patient’s injury.  Rather, the hospital must provide any incident report to any pa-
tient.102  Amendment 7 states, “[i]n addition to any other similar rights provided 
herein or by general law, patients have a right to have access to any records made or 
received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any 
adverse medical incident.”103  “Patient” is defined by the amendment as “an indi-
vidual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing, or has undergone care or treatment 
in a health care facility or by a health care provider.”104  The amendment does not 
specify that the patient must seek only those records relating to that patient’s treat-
ment, although it does require hospitals to redact patient identifying information 
when disclosing incident reports to others.105
Enabling legislation, passed one year after the amendment was ratified, at-
tempted to limit the reach of the amendment by stating that incident reports created 
prior to the passage of the amendment were not available for disclosure because they 
were created under confidential circumstances.106  The legislation also attempted to 
define “patient” more narrowly with regard to patient access to incident records.107 
Florida courts have held the enabling legislation unconstitutional.108  Currently, any 
incident report created after the passage of the constitutional amendment is open to 
access by the patient involved, or by patients who may have experienced a similar 
incident, and it is likely that any incident report created before the amendment will 
also be accessible to those patients, and in reality, to the general public.109
Hospitals in Florida therefore have little state protection for their incident re-
ports.  In Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen, each of the plaintiffs in three 
101. Fla. Const. art. X, § 25.
102. See, e.g., Morton Plant Hosp. Ass’n v. Shahbas ex. rel. Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820, 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007) (“[T]he Shahbases, as previous patients, are entitled to any of the hospital’s records relating to any 
adverse medical incident.  There is no requirement that the records discoverable under Amendment 7 be 
relevant to any pending litigation.”).
103. Fla. Const. art. X, § 25(a).
104. Id. at (c)(2).
105. Id. at § 25; James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know Come at 
Too High a Price?, 24 Trial Advoc. Q. 7, 11 (2005).
106. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.028 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008).
107. Id. at (7)(a) (“Pursuant to s. 25, Art. X of the State Constitution, the adverse medical incident records to 
which a patient is granted access are those of the facility or provider of which he or she is a patient and 
which pertain to any adverse medical incident affecting the patient or any other patient which involves 
the same or substantially similar condition, treatment, or diagnosis as that of the patient requesting access.” 
(emphasis added)).
108. See Notami Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
109. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 105, at 11.
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medical malpractice cases consolidated for trial requested that the hospital produce 
peer review, risk management, and credentialing documents.110  When the trial court 
ordered the hospital to produce the documents, the hospital petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari.111  The appellate court denied the writ, stating that “the Hospital does not 
have a vested right in maintaining the confidentiality of adverse medical incidents 
[because t]he Hospital’s ‘right’ is no more than an expectation that previously ex-
isting statutory law would not change.”112  The appellate court held that the enabling 
legislation, section 381.028 of the Florida Statutes, “impermissibly restricts rights 
expressly granted under the Constitution.”113
More research must be done to know whether Florida’s mandatory incident re-
porting, coupled with the newfound public access to those reports, has had any effect 
on the level of reporting actually done by hospitals.  In Florida’s Agency for Health 
Care Administration’s March 2007 Risk Management and Patient Safety Newsletter, 
the agency reported that 710 incidents were reported from 282 licensed hospitals.114 
One hundred and two of those did not file any incident reports in two of the last 
three years.115  It seems unlikely that those 102 hospitals did not have any reportable 
incidents during that time period.  In any event, as compared to other states with 
published data, like New York, this level of mandatory reporting is very low.116
The PSQIA provides a privilege and confidentiality provision that protects pa-
tient safety work product from discovery.117  While the federal legislation is clear 
that it preempts state law, it is also clear that it only protects specific data, not any 
state-mandated reporting, and so will not provide any additional protection for the 
two aforementioned reports that hospitals must file with Florida’s Department of 
Health.118  
 2. New York
New York presents a very different side of the debate.  State law mandates that 
hospitals report any incidents that, among other things, did or could have harmed or 
110. 927 So. 2d 139, 141–42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), aff ’d in part per curiam, Florida Hosp. Waterman, 
Inc., v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing, retroactive, 
and applies to records that existed before its passage; those sections of 381.028 that conflict with the 
amendment are unconstitutional and severed from the statute).
111. Id. at 141.
112. Id. at 143–44.
113. Id. at 143.  
114. See Risk Mgmt. and Patient Safety Newsl. (Agency for Healthcare Administration, Tallahassee, 
FL), March 2007, at 1, available at http://www.fdhc.state.f l.us/MCHQ/Health_Facility_Regulation/
Risk/documents/march_2007_RM_newsletter.pdf.
115. Id.
116. See Flink et al., supra note 83.
117. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22; see also Patient Safety and 
Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8140–56.
118. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121.  
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killed a patient.  Specifically, Public Health Law section 2805-l says, “All hospitals . 
. . shall be required to report incidents . . . to the [Department of Health] in a 
manner and within time periods as may be specified by regulation of the 
department.”119  The statute lists the types of incidents required to be reported, in-
cluding patient death or bodily function impairment not related to the patient’s 
illness, hospital fires, equipment malfunctions, poisonings, strikes, disasters not 
originating within the hospital, and the termination of hospital services such as heat, 
laundry, food, or rodent control.120  Incident reporting is mandatory in New York: 
hospitals that do not report adverse events to the New York Patient Occurrence 
Reporting and Tracking System (“NYPORTS”) may be publicly sanctioned.121
After less than successful attempts with other reporting methods, including a 
paper-based method, New York created a secure electronic reporting system, 
NYPORTS, to simplify the reporting process.122  Two other New York statutes, 
Public Health Law section 2805-m and Education Law section 6527, provide for the 
confidentiality of the reports entered into the NYPORTS system.  Public Health 
Law section 2805-m states that “reports required to be submitted pursuant to [statu-
tory requirements] shall be kept confidential and shall not be released except to the 
department.”123  It also provides an additional layer of protection by specifying that 
the reports may not be accessed from the Department of Health through use of the 
New York freedom of information law.124  In addition, Education Law section 6527 
states that “records relating to performance of a medical or a quality assurance review 
function” are generally exempt from disclosure.125   
For the most part, the statutory confidentiality provisions that protect these 
mandatory reports work to both encourage providers to comply with the reporting 
requirements and to protect providers in litigation.126  For example, the First 
119. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-l(1) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2008).
120. Id. at § 2805-l(2).
121. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, Office of Health Systems Mgmt., N.Y.  Patient Occurrence 
Reporting and Tracking System Report 3–6 (2000–2001).  Compliance with the reporting 
requirements is monitored through “overall hospital surveillance activities” which include chart reviews 
by an outside independent agency.  Id.
122. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 137–38.
123. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-m(1) (McKinney 2007).  
124. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-m.
125. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6527(3); see, e.g., Orner v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 761 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606–07 (1st Dep’t 
2003).
126. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Central General Hosp., Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep’t 1998).  A comparison 
between the number of reports submitted to the NYPORTS mandatory reporting system and those 
submitted to the JCAHO voluntary reporting system reveals that considerably more incidents are 
reported when the reporting is mandatory.  Flink et al., supra note 83, at 142.  Flink determined that 
between January 1995 and December 2003, 2,405 events were reported to JCAHO (176 of these were 
from New York hospitals) while during 1998 and December 2003 the NYPORTS system received 
11,028 reports.  Id.  JCAHO has published Sentinel Event Statistics as of December 31, 2007 on its 
website.  The total number of sentinel events reviewed by JCAHO between January 1995 and December 
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Department has emphasized that, although the confidentiality provisions may make 
things harder for a particular plaintiff, the plaintiff ’s hardship is outweighed by the 
benefit the public receives “by encouraging open and candid discussion.”127  Despite 
this, there are still some cases in which a hospital’s incident report is ordered released 
to the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action.  In most of these cases, disclosure is 
ordered because the report was found to have been prepared in the ordinary course of 
business,128 because it was not prepared pursuant to the quality assurance privilege,129 
or because the privilege was waived by the involvement of a third party.130 
Confidentiality may be defeated if a hospital cannot prove that it prepared its 
incident reports in accordance with statute.  For example, in Marte v. Brooklyn 
Hospital Center, the hospital did not establish that the documents were prepared pur-
suant to Public Health Law section 2805-l or Education Law section 6527(3).131 
Specifically, the court said that, “[a] review of the . . . [h]ospital’s motion for a pro-
tective order and the attached documents does not reveal any statement by the 
Hospital that it actually prepared any committee review incident reports for the 
Department of Health as required under Public Health Law § 2805-l.”132  The court 
also said that “[r]ecords generated at the behest of a quality assurance committee for 
31, 2007 is listed as 4,817.  See The Joint Commission, Sentinel Event Statistics: As of December 31, 
20 07, ht tp: //w w w.jointcommission.org/ NR /rdon ly res / D7836542-A 372-4F 93-8BD7-
DDD11D43E484/0/se_stats_063007.pdf.  It is important to keep in mind that, although New York 
and JCAHO vary in their reporting requirements and so do not require hospitals to always report the 
same incidents, JCAHO is a national accreditation agency, drawing reports from hospitals in every 
state, while the NYPORTS statistics derive only from hospitals in New York.  One researcher, 
comparing data from different state agencies, including New York, Utah, Florida, and Colorado, to data 
from JCAHO in an earlier time period, noted that part of the discrepancy between numbers is in part 
due to the difference in definition of error and adverse event.  Harrington, supra note 8, at 362–66.
127. Brathwaite v. State, 623 N.Y.S.2d 228, 235 (1st Dep’t 1995).  See also Finnegan v. State, 686 N.Y.S.2d 
589, 591–94 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1999) (comprehensive review of the differences in the appellate departments 
over the scope of the privilege).
128. Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03–6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at *1–2 
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006) (“Here, the reports in question are not assessing the care 
provided . . . . It further appears that the reports were made in the regular course of business pursuant 
to 10 NYCRR § 405.8(b)(1).”).
129. See, e.g., Feig v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 636 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995) appeal dismissed, 653 
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1st Dep’t 1997) (holding that under the education law, hospital could not keep confidential 
documents prepared by a private agency the hospital had hired to investigate an incident); Berggren v. 
Saint Vincent’s Catholic Med. Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., No. 10129/04, 2004 WL 2903641, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 
Richmond County Dec. 13, 2004) (holding that an incident report about chair that collapsed under 
patient while he sat in the waiting room not privileged).  But see People v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. 
Corp. (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 709 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (1st Dep’t 2000) (upholding 
that since defendant was not a hospital as defined under Public Health Law § 2808(1) its peer review 
and quality assurance records could not be privileged; yet the court also upheld that documents prepared 
by an “independent professional standards review firm” were privileged under Education Law § 
6527(3)).
130. See, e.g., Feig, 636 N.Y.S.2d 971.  But see N.Y. City Health and Hosp. Corp, 709 N.Y.S.2d 513.
131. 779 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (2d Dep’t 2004).
132. Id. at 87 (citing Matter of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Doe, 99 N.Y.2d 434 (2003)).  
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quality assurance purposes, including compilations, studies or comparisons derived 
from multiple records, should be privileged, whereas records simply duplicated by the 
committee are not necessarily privileged.”133  This analysis is not clear, as the court 
does not explain in further detail how it determined that the reports were not pre-
pared for the Department of Health as required by statute.  
In Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical Center, the Supreme Court 
of Suffolk County found that incident reports that are “multi-motivated,” meaning 
those that report errors pursuant to statute as well as in the regular course of busi-
ness, and that do not contain any review of quality of care, are not covered under the 
privilege.134  Part of the purpose of incident reporting is to assess quality of care.  If 
a hospital does not assess its care but simply reports an incident because it is sup-
posed to, it does not get the benefit of the privilege.  It can also be argued that if 
there is no quality assurance review analysis within the incident report, there is 
nothing in the report that needs to be kept confidential anyway, as the facts under-
lying the incident are discoverable and any error impacting the patient should have 
been recorded in the patient’s medical record. 
In addition, New York courts are clear that a document does not fall under the 
privilege simply because it was used or reviewed by a quality assurance committee. 
For example, in Spradley v. Pergament Home Centers, the Second Department noted 
that “merely because documents are placed in a quality assurance file does not ‘per se 
render these documents privileged from disclosure under the Education Law § 
6527(3).’”135  Hospitals cannot hide incriminating records by claiming a blanket 
quality assurance privilege.  Providers would be well advised to clearly label any inci-
dent reports to ensure that there is no mistaking reports for other documents that 
happen to be in a quality assurance committee’s file.  
III.  THE RISKS OF NON-CONFIDENTIALITY
A number of factors have chiseled away at the confidentiality that should be 
given to incident reports.  These factors include the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 re-
port on the prevalence of medical error in the American healthcare system,136 the 
plaintiffs’ bar,137 and public outcry demanding accountability and improved error 
reporting systems in the healthcare industry.138  One researcher notes that shortly 
after the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) released its 1999 report on medical errors, 
To Err Is Human, a national magazine published an article with a sensationalist 
133. Id. at 88.
134. No. 03-6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at *1  (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006); see also Crawford v. 
Lahiri, 673 N.Y.S.2d 189 (2d Dep’t 1998); Sonsini v. Memorial Hosp. for Cancer and Diseases, 693 
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep’t 1999) (upholding that maintenance log for mammography machine not considered 
quality assurance material).
135. 689 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep’t 1999) (quoting Heitman v. Mango, 654 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep’t 1997)). 
136. To Err Is Human, supra note 83.
137. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1063–65; Liang, supra note 29, at 348–50.
138. See Duggin, supra note 1, at 342.
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headline drawing attention to doctors and their “deadly mistakes.”139  The researcher 
also noted that following the article, plaintiffs’ attorneys often (incorrectly) referred 
to the IOM’s statistics as evidence that doctors are committing malpractice at break-
neck speed, so they should be sued more often, not less.140
The IOM’s 1999 report recommended that the United States implement a na-
tional, mandatory reporting system.141  Proponents of mandatory incident reporting 
explain that analyzing the incidents increases patient safety by requiring hospitals to 
analyze the root of the problem and implement processes to prevent the problem 
from happening again.142  By making incident reporting mandatory, providers are 
forced to evaluate the failings in their systems.  Not all reporting systems are manda-
tory, and voluntary reporting systems, like that of JCAHO, tend to have lower 
numbers of providers reporting. 143  A hospital does not have to report to JCAHO 
because a hospital does not have to be accredited by JCAHO to treat patients, al-
though most hospitals prefer to take on the extra responsibility to appear more 
reliable and trustworthy.144  But because both the accreditation and the reporting are 
voluntary, there is less at stake for a hospital that is non-compliant with JCAHO. 
However, even in mandatory reporting systems, reporting levels may be low because 
providers may decide to risk sanctions instead of disclosure.  This may have contrib-
uted to the low numbers that Florida reports.145
Many proponents also think that the reports should be shared with other hospi-
tals and healthcare institutions, because while “[t]he primary purpose of reporting is 
to learn from experience,” sharing the reports with other institutions enables those 
institutions to also learn from another’s experience and implement their own preven-
tative measures.146  By seeing where others have gone wrong, hospitals have the 
opportunity to correct the same or similar problems in their systems and processes 
139. Harrington, supra note 8, at 343–44 (citing Michael D. Lemonick, Doctors’ Deadly Mistakes, TIME, 
Dec. 13, 1999, at 74).
140. Id.
141. To Err Is Human, supra note 83, at 9.  In 1999, the IOM published its ground-breaking report, To Err 
Is Human, in which its authors noted that at least 44,000 and possibly as many as 98,000 Americans die 
each year because of medical errors.  Id. at 26.  The IOM, a non-governmental organization associated 
with the National Academy of Sciences, provides advice to the federal government on such issues as 
health and medical issues, among others.  See Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, http://
www.iom.edu (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
142. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 144.  
143. Furrow, supra note 62, at 14 (“The third problem [of three problems with the JCAHO disclosure 
standard] is, lacking real regulatory muscle, the level of actual disclosure of errors has been very low.”).
144. See Joint Comm’n, Accreditation Programs—Hospitals, http://www.joint-commission.org (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2008) (“The Joint Commission has been accrediting hospitals for more than 50 years.  Its 
accreditation is a nationwide seal of approval that indicates a hospital meets high performance 
standards.”).
145. See Risk Mgmt. and Patient Safety Newsl., supra note 114, at 1.
146. Leape, supra note 80.
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before the same mistakes happen in their institutions.147  The PSQIA takes a new 
step toward a national reporting system and in ensuring confidentiality to those 
analyses of incidents reported into its system.  But the PSQIA does not protect inci-
dent reports made for other purposes.148  Ultimately, the problem is that neither 
mandatory nor voluntary reporting can or will work effectively until full privilege is 
restored to incident reports.
While some physicians and professional medical associations oppose mandatory 
reporting,149 the public thinks mandatory reporting improves accountability.150  But 
beyond simply wanting incidents to be reported, the public wants access to those re-
ports: “62 to 73 percent of Americans believe that healthcare providers should be 
required to make this information [uncovered during investigations] publicly 
available.”151  The fact that a high percentage of the public may want these reports 
can play directly into the fears of providers, which can lead to less thorough re-
porting, and ultimately defeats the goals of the reporting—accountability and quality 
improvement.152
Several arguments urge the disclosure of incident reports, the first being the in-
terest of the injured plaintiff.  In the course of litigating a malpractice case, a patient 
will use, among other things, his medical chart to prove that a provider did not per-
form to a reasonable standard of care.153  But if the medical chart does not contain 
the information the patient seeks, such as notations regarding an error or an indica-
tion of a deviation from the standard of care, and given evidence that doctors 
147. See Office of Health Systems Mgmt., N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health, N.Y. Patient Occurrence 
Reporting and Tracking System Report 2000/2001 6 (July 2003), http://www.health.state.ny.us/
nysdoh/hospital/nyports/annual_report/2000-2001/pdf/2000-2001_annual_report.pdf (explaining the 
database of reported adverse events in NY: “While the identity of individual hospitals in the comparative 
groups is not disclosed, the comparative database is a useful tool in support of hospital quality 
improvement activities”).
148. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8121 (“[I]nformation that is collected to 
comply with external obligations is not patient safety work product.  Such activities may include: State 
incident reporting requirements . . . .”). 
149. See Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors—Could It Do Harm?, 342 
New Eng. J. Med. 1123 (2000); Michelle Harper & Robert L. Helmreich, Identifying Barriers to the 
Success of a Reporting System, in 3 Advances in Patient Safety: From Research to Implementation 
167, 172 (2005).
150. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 148.
151. Leape, supra note 80 (citing The Kaiser Family Found., National Survey on Americans as 
Health Care Consumers (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Washington, D.C., 
December 2000)).
152. Although not directly on point in this note, it should be noted that there is a prevalence of “shame and 
blame” within the medical industry that points fingers at individuals; this environment has further 
perpetuated providers’ fears of being singled out.  However, the IOM report and a number of scholars 
have concluded that error in the medical industry is more often the result of a system’s failure than 
attributable to individuals.  See, e.g., Liang & Small, supra note 29, at 222–26. 
153. See, e.g., Talavera ex rel. Rios v. N.Y. City Health and Hosps. Corp., 851 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (1st Dep’t 
2008) (“Plaintiffs submitted affirmations from a physician establishing that the medical records, on 
their face, evince that defendant failed to provide proper care to plaintiffs . . . .”).
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sometimes do not fully complete their patients’ medical records, it is not unreason-
able for the patient to wonder whether the provider has neglected to include the 
relevant information in his chart.154  The patient may then seek other documents 
from the hospital in order to make his or her case, arguing a substantial need for the 
information and undue hardship without it.  An incident report would be ideal for 
this purpose, as it may contain a description of the event, the actor(s) involved, and 
an analysis of what happened.155  It is possible that such an analysis may contain 
references or comparisons to earlier, similar incidents as well.
A second argument for disclosure of incident reports is that the public has a right 
to know which hospitals are safe and what its hospitals are doing wrong.156  Patients 
are consumers, and to be reasonably informed consumers, they should have all of the 
facts about the hospitals with which they entrust their safety and well-being.157  A 
patient cannot make an informed decision without having all of the facts at hand.158 
Public access to incident report information, such as that in Florida, gives the public 
greater control over its quality of care and allows the public to make independent, 
more educated decisions when selecting among healthcare providers.
It is therefore not surprising that providers think that if they participate in or 
share information recorded in incident reports, they risk: 1) being sued;159 2) irrepa-
rable damage to their professional reputations;160 and 3) professional sanctions.161 
Providers also worry that error or incident information shared within a confidential 
environment—i.e., with another institution for collaborative or educational purpos-
es—will waive any applicable privileges and be discoverable.162  Sometimes, these 
worries mean that they do not share error information within their own institu-
tion.163  It may seem safer to the providers not to say anything at all.
The fear of litigation from incident report disclosure has been described as over-
blown, with some researchers arguing that there has not been a demonstrated link 
154. See Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DePaul 
L. Rev. 357, 362 (2005).
155. Dollar, supra note 5, at 266–67.
156. See Laura A. Chernitsky, Note, Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Modifying the HCQIA to Allow the 
Dissemination of Physician Information to Healthcare Consumers, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737, 755–56 
(2006).
157. Other researchers have found, however, that patients either do not use quality comparisons or find the 
information on provider quality of care information not useful.  Mello et al., supra note 1, at 392–93 
(citing the six different studies).
158. On the other side of this argument, this information is already out there, although it is scattered and 
would undoubtedly be time-consuming for consumers to find and understand. Chernitsky, supra note 
156, at 742–44.
159. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 149.
160. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.
161. Id.
162. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
163. See Andrews, supra note 154.
156
MAKING THE PLAINTIFF’S BAR EARN ITS KEEP
between reporting and litigation.164  However, one researcher writes that a plaintiff ’s 
law firm received over $100 million in contingency fees over the course of five years 
by using quality of care information gleaned from nursing homes.165  Another re-
searcher points out that immediately after Florida’s constitutional amendment took 
effect, “several plaintiffs’ lawyers sent hospitals requests for the disclosure of docu-
ments that were created in confidence . . . . Plaintiffs’ attorneys were using the 
passage of Amendment 7 as a cast-net to fish for cases.”166  
Even just the worry of litigation is enough to keep providers from engaging fully 
in the incident reporting process.167  One researcher hypothesizes that “this trend by 
the courts to compel discovery of hospital incident reports will discourage health 
care providers from making immediate, full disclosure; rather, health care providers 
will likely report only minimal factual descriptions of accidents already contained in 
the patient’s chart.”168  A national study of risk managers in 2002, performed in re-
sponse to JCAHO’s implementation of a sentinel event policy, revealed that 
“[r]eluctance to disclose preventable harms was twice as likely to occur at hospitals 
having major concerns about the malpractice implications of disclosure.”169  The 
study examined why there was little reporting and found the reasons to be “failure to 
recognize that an error occurred, liability worries, concerns about job security . . . 
and concerns about personal and professional reputation.”170  Other studies of error 
reporting show that many errors and near misses are never actually reported.171 
Providers may choose not to disclose a near miss or minor incident to an affected 
patient, preferring to avoid any chance of litigation and damage to reputation under 
the rationale that the patient was not harmed, and does not need to know.172  Some 
164. Leape, supra note 80; see also Rae M. Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National 
Survey, 22 Health Affairs 73, 80 (2003) (“A different, and increasingly prominent, twist on the 
malpractice issue is that clinicians’ and hospital’s perceptions about litigation risk may be worse than the 
reality.”).  
165. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 618. 
166. Hawkins, supra note 66, at 7–8.
167. In her note, Dollar cites to an older study of Ohio hospitals in which the hospital staff had compiled 
incident reports for only half of the incidents that resulted in legal action against the hospital.  Dollar, 
supra note 5, at 286 (citing Gladys Duran, Positive Use of Incident Reports, 53 Hosps. 60, 60 (1979)). 
Additional research should be done in this area to determine whether there has been any improvement 
in incident report completion. 
168. Dollar, supra note 5, at 260.
169. Lamb et al., supra note 164, at 73.  The study found that “fear of medical malpractice litigation was still 
the most commonly cited institutional barrier to developing and implementing disclosure policies, 
followed by staff opposition.”  Id. at 76.  
170. Furrow, supra note 62, at 29.
171. Id. (noting “[o]ne study found that twenty-nine percent of observed errors were not reported”). 
172. See Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1072 (citing Thomas H. Gallager et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How 
Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 Archives Internal Med. 1585, 1585 
(2006)).  But see Am. Medical Ass’n, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions With 
Annotations, –, 242 (2006) (“An expression of concern need not be an admission of 
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other researchers have found that providers are more inclined to tell patients about 
the little things.173  This lack of reporting may not be improved despite the protec-
tions that will arise with the implementation of the PSQIA, particularly in states 
that have mandatory reporting requirements.  This is because providers, concerned 
with confidentiality and afraid of the implications of full disclosure, may continue to 
divulge only the barest facts or will not report at all, lending little value in the new 
federal reporting system.  A reporting system can only be effective if its providers 
feel protected.
Studies have found that providers would be more motivated to report if the re-
ports were protected from discovery.174  Protecting the confidentiality of the reporting 
system is one of five critical elements identified by researchers at the New York 
Department of Health for a successful mandatory reporting system.175  While many 
experts in the field disagree on how to improve the quality of care patients receive in 
hospitals, “quality experts almost universally agree that an important predicate to 
quality improvement is for providers themselves to identify medical errors and other 
quality problems through data analysis and the generation of self-critical quality of 
care information.”176  Confidentiality must be a part of the providers’ internal review 
process.  It is safe to surmise that without this protection, whether or not there is a 
legitimate basis for providers’ fears, reports will lack any useful mental impressions or 
thorough analysis, containing only the same bare facts that can be found in the med-
ical record.  Absent as well will be the opportunity to learn any lasting, meaningful 
lesson about the error—why it happened, and how another can be prevented, perhaps 
at a different hospital across the country.
The problem of the unprotected incident report looms particularly large in states 
where providers must report, and especially for healthcare systems that provide care 
in more than one state.177  Hospitals are often already required by the state in which 
they are licensed to report adverse events.  And to be accredited by independent or-
ganizations, such as JCAHO, they must also analyze and report incidents.178  In 
responsibility. When patient harm has been caused by an error, physicians should offer a general 
explanation . . . . Such communication is fundamental to the trust that underlies the patient-physician 
relationship, and may help reduce the risk of liability.”). 
173. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 154, at 361.
174. Harper & Helmreich, supra note 149, at 177.
175. Flink et al., supra note 83, at 149.  The four other elements are: 1) collaborative system development 
with the stakeholders; 2) clear reporting criteria; 3) continual training; and 4) creating a stakeholder 
advisory group.  Id.
176. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 596.
177. Some physician researchers argue for fewer regulators as one solution.  “Pluralistic regulation is a choice, 
not an inevitability.  In other industries in which safety is a concern, we have limited the number of 
regulators.”  Mello et al., supra note 1, at 403.  While not the central focus of this note, it would likely 
be easier to mandate the confidentiality of incident reports if the number of regulators was limited. 
Other researchers advocate for a national agency to collect all of the error information.  See Liang, supra 
note 29, at 357.
178. See, e.g., JCAHO, supra note 86.
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addition, hospital risk management departments and quality assurance committees 
review and analyze incidents in an attempt to improve hospital processes and prevent 
errors from happening in the future.179  Thorough, thoughtful, and self-critical inci-
dent reporting is essential for the hospital and, in particular, for its patients.180 
Hospitals may feel they are risking a great deal by opening up their analysis to regu-
lators, and perhaps even their own internal quality improvement staff, for fear that 
the public, knowing those reports are there, will seek the information.181  These 
fears, and continued encroachment on confidentiality such as Florida’s constitutional 
amendment, will lead to bare-bones reporting without thorough analysis.
Incident reports, particularly those analyzing systems’ breakdowns and root 
causes of incidents, may also make life much easier for a plaintiff ’s attorney.182  The 
reports explain what went wrong, why, list the hospital employees involved, and may 
discuss or compare the reported incident with previous ones.  If a plaintiff ’s attorney 
can access the incident report, much of that attorney’s work is already done.183 
Incident reports provide a vehicle for the hospitals to improve their quality of care, to 
learn from others’ mistakes, and for the states to assist in improving rates of errors. 
They are not meant to give a plaintiff a leg up in settlement negotiations, or at trial, 
but a lack of confidentiality leads them to be used for this purpose.184
In states where providers are required to report incidents, loss of privilege, or 
lack of privilege to begin with, is especially a problem.185  In these states, because of 
the mandate to file incident reports after certain events, courts may view the reports 
179. See Dollar, supra note 5; Healy et al., supra note 5.
180. See Dollar, supra note 5, at 264 (explaining why incident reporting is important); Duggin, supra note 1, 
at 346 (expressing the concern that with loss of attorney-client privilege, less will be committed to 
writing, with adverse consequences).
181. Duggin, supra note 1, at 341 (“[F]ear that materials generated in the course of quality reviews will end 
up in the hands of prosecutors or civil plaintiffs undoubtedly diminishes the enthusiasm for the review 
process.”). 
182. See Dollar, supra note 5, at 291–92.
183. See, e.g.,  Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478  (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (Wells, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The dissent notes that it is fundamentally unfair to allow 
into evidence records of hospital investigations that were previously protected by statute.  Id. at 495. 
However, the majority opinion found that to disallow access to records of adverse incidents created 
before the passage of the amendment would defeat the purpose of the amendment and “a patient would 
never actually gain the access plainly promised by the amendment.”  Id. at 489–90.  “Clearly, one of the 
primary purposes of the amendment is to provide a patient contemplating treatment by a medical 
provider access to that provider’s past history of adverse incidents.”  Id. at 490 n.6.
184. There has been some consideration as to whether the tort system provides a method of improving 
patient safety at hospitals.  However, some researchers find that relying on the tort system to improve 
safety is ill-advised: 
  [The tort system’s] ability to set new standards for patient safety is circumscribed by the 
continued reliance of most states’ courts on medical custom to set the standard of care . . . 
[a]t best, it is a regulator of last resort, seeking to make whole those who have suffered 
injuries that other forms of regulation have tried and failed to prevent.
 Mello et al., supra note 1, at 418.
185. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.A.
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as part of the business operations of a hospital and not subject to a particular privi-
lege.186  Arguably, incident reports are not created in the ordinary course of business, 
as healthcare providers are not generally in the business of injuring people.187  Yet, 
this argument does not always hold up at trial.188 
Overall, the continued lack of protection for incident reports detracts from the 
quality of our health care, perpetuates the shame-and-blame culture of medical error, 
and can unfairly prejudice the defendant provider in litigation.  In addition, such 
potential disclosure of incident reports ultimately endangers everyone who uses the 
healthcare system.
IV.  RETHINKING THE INCIDENT REPORT
There is a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of incident reports that 
has pervaded our medical and legal systems.  Incident reports do not provide any-
thing new to an investigation except opportunity for the plaintiff.  They are, and 
should remain, a tool for the hospitals to improve the quality of their care.  Making 
hospital incident reports discoverable only impedes the quality assurance function 
they are meant to serve.  Error reporting and quality improvement have reached a 
stalemate.  Incident reports must be taken out of the equation completely in order to 
propel the healthcare industry beyond its current stagnant relationship with medical 
error.  While the PSQIA is a start, federal legislation must go further in providing a 
broad protection to all incident reports, including those required to be reported to 
state regulators, and preempt state law that says otherwise. 
One study identifies three primary reasons why quality of care information 
should be kept confidential: 1) providers who review their quality of care usually 
provide better care; 2) lack of confidentiality is a disincentive to providers to review 
their care; and 3) healthcare providers are already subject to sanctions by state and 
federal governments when their care is substandard.189  The key to understanding 
why incident reports should be kept confidential in litigation, whether or not they 
are disclosed within a particular community for the purpose of quality improvement, 
lies in remembering that the underlying facts of the adverse event are discoverable, as 
is the affected patient’s medical record.190  It is the responsibility of the physicians 
186. See, e.g., Williams v. Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03–6201, 2006 WL 2559527, at 
*1 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County July 26, 2006).
187. While it can be argued that it should be regular procedure for a hospital to analyze its procedures after 
an incident, this regular procedure should not be considered within the hospital’s ordinary course of 
business because its business is providing health care; incidents are often unique and unpredictable.
188. See, e.g., Williams, 2006 WL 2559527, at *2 (“It further appears that the reports were made in the 
regular course of business pursuant to 10 NYCRR § 405.8(b)(1).”).
189. Healy et al., supra note 5, at 600–01.
190. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).  Thus, it is the patient’s medical record and not the incident report that 
should be deemed part of the health provider’s regular course of business, though both may be kept as 
such.  And in fact, much information about a provider’s quality of care is already required to be made 
available to the public, including the results of a state agency’s review of a facility and information on 
providers who have violated the law.  Healy et al., supra note 5, at 614–15.
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and other caregivers to note any mistakes along with everything else in the patient’s 
record,191 and “most states have statutory penalties for inaccurate, incomplete, or 
falsified hospital records.”192  The proposed regulations for the PSQIA underscore 
this by specifically defining a patient’s medical record and other information that 
goes into the record as not patient safety work product.193   
An incident report is not a set of new facts, or a repository for those facts a guilt-
ridden doctor would like to keep hidden from the patient.  On the contrary, an 
incident report is a hospital’s analysis of a problem and a compilation of the findings 
of the hospital’s investigation into the matter, described so that the hospital can learn 
from its mistakes.194  If done well, an incident report is a candid, thorough examina-
tion of what went wrong.195  The incident report is the hospital’s research into its 
processes and is for the benefit of the hospital—and all of the hospital’s patients.  But 
because of this candid research into previous occurrences, staff behavior, and equip-
ment performance, incident reports can be a gold mine for a patient’s attorney.196 
The hospital can be penalized for attempting to prevent future harm.  By allowing 
discovery of incident reports—documents meant for self-evaluation and fulfillment 
of regulatory requirements—the quality of our health care is endangered.197
While the patient’s attorney absolutely should not be barred from discovering 
the facts, the patient’s attorney should be denied access to what essentially amount to 
arguments made for it by the defendant.198  The hospital should not be required to 
present the patient with his or her case.  Likewise, incident reports should not be 
191. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1070–72.
192. Dollar, supra note 5, at 262–63.  See also N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(32) (McKinney 2002), which deems 
“[f]ailing to maintain a record for each patient which accurately ref lects the evaluation and treatment of 
the patient” professional misconduct.  A physician found guilty of misconduct can be subjected to any 
number of penalties, including up to a $10,000 fine for each instance of misconduct and revocation of 
the provider’s license.”  N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230-a (McKinney 2001 & Supp 2008); see, e.g., 
Saunders v. Admin. Review Bd. for Prof ’l Med. Conduct, 695 N.Y.S.2d 778 (3d Dep’t 1999) (upholding 
suspension of a doctor’s medical license for inadequate medical records, deceptive advertising, and 
ordering unnecessary medical tests).  In Florida, failing to keep legible medical records that justify the 
course of treatment is grounds for disciplinary action.  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.331(1)(m) (West 2007). 
It should be noted that complete medical records are also important for hospitals that participate in the 
Medicare program.  See, e.g., Jeff Sinaiko et al., Emerging Issues in Physician Documentation and 
Compliance: All of the Old, More of the New, 9 J. Health Care Compliance 5 (2007).
193. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8173.
194. See, e.g., JCAHO, supra note 86 (describing root cause analysis requirements for analyzing sentinel 
events).
195. See id.
196. See Healy et al., supra note 5, at 618–19.
197. Dollar, supra note 5, at 267.
198. See Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, supra note 14, at 5 (“[I]ndividuals should have 
access to information leading up to and including the occurrence of a preventable error that caused their 
serious injury or the death of a family member.  However . . . subsequent ‘root-cause’ analyses undertaken 
to determine the internal shortcomings of the hospital’s delivery system should not be subject to 
discovery in litigation . . . .”).
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discoverable in litigation because the relevant information they provide should be 
duplicative of what is already recorded in the patient’s chart.  Further, any changes to 
processes or systems recommended in the report cannot be introduced as evidence of 
wrongdoing because such recommendations may be considered remedial action, and 
as such cannot be introduced to show liability.199
As discussed above, hospital incident reports are the hospital’s analysis of a 
problem.  Using the facts of the incident, the hospital is able to analyze what went 
wrong in the hopes of improving its quality of care.  These facts are also available to 
the plaintiff because they are found in the patient’s medical chart and record.200 
There is no need to give the plaintiff ’s attorney access to a document that reiterates 
facts already available and that may lay out the plaintiff ’s case, to the detriment of 
the defense and the general public.  
Yet patients and their attorneys should be reassured that hospitals cannot use the 
incident report as a hiding place for facts that a hospital does not wish plaintiffs to 
learn.201  And in fact, model legislation proposed by researchers thirteen years ago 
emphasizes that hospitals should not include facts in the incident report that cannot 
be found in the medical and other records of the hospital accessible by the plain-
tiff.202  This is echoed in the PSQIA.  In the proposed regulations, the following is 
excluded from the definition of patient safety work product: “a patient’s original 
medical record, billing and discharge information, or any or any other original infor-
mation that is collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately 
from, a patient safety evaluation system.”203  
Providers also face serious sanctions for not completing patients’ charts on a 
timely basis.204  To more effectively counter bad physician behavior and to give 
injured patients what they need to be made whole, attention should focus not on ac-
cessing incident reports, but on sanctioning providers who do not complete their 
patients’ charts accurately and on a timely basis.  To aid chart completion, other pro-
vider staff who notice the incomplete chart should be encouraged to report 
noncompliance, perhaps with education about labor laws prohibiting retaliation and 
access to an anonymous hotline.205  There can be no excuse for not completing a 
199. Fed. R. Evid. 407; see also Johnson & Shapiro, supra note 29, at 7–8 (describing states’ evidence rules on 
remedial action).
200. See Dollar, supra note 5.
201. See id. at 262–63 (citing William H. Roach, Jr. et al., Medical Records and the Law 15, 
Appendix B (1985); Janine Fiesta, The Law and Liability: A Guide For Nurses 173–93 (2 ed. 
1988)).
202. See generally Dollar, supra note 5; Healy et al., supra note 5.
203. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8120.
204. See, e.g., Gray v. Jaeger, 794 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep’t 2005) (upholding an order to strike defendant 
physician’s answer, as his failure to keep medical records was negligent and precluded plaintiff from 
presenting prima facie case); Ruggiero v. State Dep’t of Health, 643 N.Y.S.2d 698 (3d Dep’t 1996) 
(upholding the revocation of license for physician who kept a filthy office, mixed food and medication 
in refrigerator, and relied on memory, not paper records, when treating patients).
205. See, e.g., N.Y. Lab. Law § 741 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2008).  
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patient’s chart accurately and expeditiously.  Providers cannot hide the facts of a 
course of treatment, even if they might like to.  And while it may be true in some 
cases that a patient may bear an undue burden in proving his or her case without 
benefit of the incident report, in those cases, the court must review the incident re-
port in-camera to determine what, if anything, should be released to the plaintiff. 
Recognizing that incident reports may only be discoverable when medical charts are 
not accurately completed may provide additional incentive to providers to ensure 
charts are complete.
In addition, although some defense attorneys may disagree, providers must be 
forthright with their patients.  It may be, but is not always true, that a patient does 
not need access to the incident report to know something went wrong with his or her 
procedure.206  The Joint Commission and many institutions already require that mis-
takes be disclosed to patients even if the patient would have been unaware.207  Where 
state law does not mandate disclosure, a physician’s code of ethics does: “Hospitals, 
physicians, or nurses have no moral or legal rights to withhold information from pa-
tients.  Full disclosure is not an option; it is an ethical imperative.”208  Some hospitals 
have instituted full disclosure and apology policies, gambling on the theory that af-
fected patients will be less likely to sue if they are dealt with honestly and sincerely.209 
It is worth noting that defense attorneys generally greet such policies with skepti-
cism.210  The patient must be told of the error, and will have the ability to access the 
medical chart if he or she decides to take further action.  Informing the patient of an 
error is without question difficult for the provider, but disclosure to the patient is 
necessary so that the provider may appropriately be held liable if the patient has been 
harmed.211  However, the fact that a provider made an error does not give the patient 
license to delve into the provider’s quality assurance work.  If the patient is given that 
206. This is not true for near miss incidents in which an error almost happens but is averted, either 
intentionally or not.  It is unfortunate, although perhaps not entirely surprising, that some studies have 
found that doctors routinely do not report errors to patients.  See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 154, at 
370–71.
207. Furrow, supra note 62, at 12–14; Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1071; Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and 
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1447, 1452 (2000).
208. Pegalis, supra note 8, at 1072 (quoting Lucian Leape, Forward to Disclosing Medical Errors: A 
Guide to an Effective Explanation and Apology, v–vi (Joint Commission Res. 2007)); see also 
American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Current Opinions With 
Annotations, –, 242 (2006).  Aside from being an ethical imperative, it is essential to keep 
patients informed to provide dignified and informed care.  Peter A. Clark, Medication Errors in Family 
Practice, in Hospitals and After Discharge from the Hospital: An Ethical Analysis, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 
349, 354 (2004) (arguing that a mandatory reporting system is a way to ensure the autonomy and dignity 
of patients).
209. See, e.g., Lamb et al., supra note 164; see also Cohen, supra note 207 (reviewing risks and benefits of 
apology). 
210. See Cohen, supra note 207, at 1458.
211. Clearly, this view portrays the ideal.  See Andrews, supra note 154, at 362 (noting that “some physicians 
in the [author’s] study indicated that they did not include information about errors in the patient’s chart 
because they wanted to avoid litigation”).
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access, our cycle of medical error will undoubtedly continue.  Patients must unequiv-
ocally be denied access to the incident report; medical record completion and 
disclosure must be strictly enforced.
Much is made of the fact that hospitals ought to report to enhance accountability 
and to improve quality of care.212  By creating a data repository where errors can be 
analyzed, hospitals will be better able to examine their mistakes as well as to learn 
from the mistakes of others.  And at least twenty states already require hospitals to 
report incidents, thereby improving accountability, particularly when hospitals that 
fail to report are subject to sanctions.213  But reporting for its educational and regula-
tory value can easily be confused with reporting for punitive purposes.  Attempts to 
use the incident report for something other than its intended purpose of quality as-
surance ignores the fact that hospitals cannot keep the evidence of an error to 
themselves and hinders vital quality assurance activities.214  Hospitals must provide 
the plaintiff with access to the facts underlying the case, but they must be allowed to 
keep their quality of care information confidential.
In court, hospitals argue against disclosure of incident reports, citing attorney-
client privilege because they were confidential communications between attorney 
and client, and attorney work product privilege as they were prepared in anticipation 
of litigation.215  Making such an argument also does not halve the dual purpose of 
the incident report (preparation for litigation and quality assurance) to one; in other 
words, simply because the providers argue that the reports were prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation does not mean that they were not also prepared for quality assurance 
purposes internal to the hospital.  It is problematic that incident reports get tied up 
in litigation when their purpose ought to be for the hospital to conduct research on 
its own failings, and to improve.  
To improve the state of medical care, the hospital must not just be held account-
able or found liable.  Simply sanctioning or suing a hospital does little to further the 
quality of care for the rest of the patients, because to adequately understand the mis-
take and protect future patients, the hospital must perform a thorough self-evaluation 
that includes honestly analyzing its mistakes.216  That analysis should be kept confi-
dential.  
212. See generally To Err Is Human, supra note 83; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force, 
supra note 14.
213. See, e.g., Leape, supra note 80.
214. Further research needs to be done to compare actual quality of health care in states that give access to 
incident reports as opposed to states that keep incident reports confidential.  More thorough analysis of 
reporting statistics, as well as whether errors are repeated, can shed light on whether allowing access to 
incident reports hinders the improvement of health care to more patients than the one affected by the 
error.  While it is generally assumed that the mandatory collection of error data (or collection of error 
data in general) improves the overall quality and safety of hospital care, recent studies have put this into 
question.  Liang, supra note 29, at 348. 
215. See, e.g., Flynn v. Univ. Hospital, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1300 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).  
216. Dollar, supra note 5.
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As the Department of Health and Human Services completes its promulgation 
of the PSQIA regulations,217 it will likely take into consideration the incident re-
port’s dual purposes of reporting and self-analysis.218  Much of the impetus for the 
PSQIA was a recognition that to encourage providers to report an error, there needed 
to be assurance that the reports would be kept confidential.219  The proposed regula-
tions address this by proposing civil money penalties of up to $10,000 for breach of 
confidentiality provisions by disclosing patient safety work product to third par-
ties.220  Ultimately, though, it seems that the PSQIA will not go far enough, as 
hospitals in some states, such as those in Florida, need protection for all of their in-
cident reporting activities and not just those that are reported to the PSO.  In 
addition, in states that require providers to report, reporting to yet another agency 
will likely be burdensome, particularly when the incentive of confidentiality does not 
help where help is needed.  The federal law needs a broader preemption to be able to 
include all hospitals in all states, and to actually have some measure of success.  This 
could arguably take management of health away from the state, but would improve 
health care for the country as a whole, and, like the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 does for employers, would ultimately simplify things for hos-
pital systems.221  Instead of having to worry about several different layers of reporting 
they could worry about one.222  Physician licensing and hospital accountability could 
still remain under state law, but reporting of incidents should be directly and only to 
the federal government, which could then relay relevant information to states with 
recommendations for sanctions but without disclosure of the report itself.  Nothing 
should be withheld from the patient except the hospital’s own self-evaluation.  
V. CONCLUSION
Medical errors continue to occur despite increased public awareness and pressure 
from parts of society to improve the healthcare delivery system.  However, improve-
ment cannot be made until providers feel confident that reporting errors will not lead 
to increased liability.  One step towards achieving this improvement is the reimag-
ining of incident reports—documents that compile the results of a hospital’s 
investigation into what went wrong—from something other than a tool for a plain-
tiff ’s attorney.  Instead, they should be thought of as what they actually are: research 
217. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8112.  The proposed rules were released on 
February 12, 2008, for a period of public comment. 
218. The Office of Civil Rights within the Department of Health and Human Services was given the 
authority to promulgate regulations under the PSQIA in May 2006.  See 71 Fed. Reg. 28701, 28701–
28702 (May 17, 2006).
219. See Furrow, supra note 62, at 17.
220. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 8113.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
222. See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 62, at 18 (“State mandatory reporting systems . . . may also cause 
inconsistencies and result in confusing procedures and inaccurate data, or not data collected at all.”).
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for the hospital into its own failings so that it can improve, and so that ultimately all 
healthcare consumers may benefit from this reflective, self-evaluative process.
